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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal linear taxes on capital and labor incomes in a life-cycle
model of human capital investment, financial savings, and labor supply with heteroge-
nous individuals. A dual income tax with a positive marginal tax rate on not only
labor income but also capital income is optimal. The positive tax on capital income
serves to alleviate the distortions of the labor tax on human capital accumulation.
The optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is lower than that on labor income
if savings are elastic compared to investment in human capital; substitution between
inputs in human capital formation is difficult; and most investments in human capital
are verifiable. Numerical calculations suggest that the optimal marginal tax rate on
capital income is close to the tax rate on labor income.
Keywords: human capital, labor income taxation, capital income taxation, life cy-
cle, education subsidies.
JEL codes: H2, H5, I2, J2.
1 Introduction
The case for zero taxation of capital income is quite strong in models with infinitely lived
individuals. In particular, this zero-tax result holds for quite general specifications of prefer-
ences (see Chamley, 1986; and Judd, 1985, 1999). Erosa and Gervais (2002) analyze optimal
capital income taxes in life-cycle models rather than models with infinitely lived individuals.
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They show that optimal capital taxes are not necessarily zero if utility is not additively sep-
arable in consumption and leisure, or, if utility does not feature weak separability between
leisure and homothetic sub-utility over consumption. Building upon Ramsey-Corlett-Hague
intuition, Erosa and Gervais (2002) demonstrate that optimal capital taxes are positive if
leisure and consumption are more complementary later in life than they are earlier in life.
See also Bernheim (2002) for a more elaborate discussion.1
Another strand of literature stresses the role of incomplete markets rather than life-cycle
issues. Aiyagari (1995) and Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2004) derive optimal taxes
on capital incomes in infinitely lived agent models in the presence of incomplete capital or
insurance markets. Both papers find that capital income is optimally taxed at positive
rates. Intuitively, positive capital income taxes redistribute resources from unconstrained
towards liquidity constrained phases in the life cycle and from high income states towards
low income states of nature. Hence, a positive tax on capital income helps to complete the
missing capital and insurance markets.
We establish another case for positive capital taxes by allowing for endogenous human
capital formation in a life-cycle model.2 In contrast to the papers mentioned above, our
case for positive capital income taxes relies neither on non-separable preferences nor market
failures.3 Indeed, in our setting with weakly separable preferences and perfect financial
markets, optimal capital taxes would be zero in the absence of human capital formation. To
develop our case, we formulate a simple three period life-cycle model of labor supply, human
capital and financial savings with heterogenous agents who differ in their abilities to acquire
human capital. Individuals invest in human capital in the first period of their lives. In the
second period, they work and consume leisure. They retire and consume all their assets in
the last, third period.
We demonstrate that positive capital taxes are optimal to alleviate the distortionary
effects of the labor tax on investments in human capital. Whereas labor taxes encourage
individuals to substitute human by financial assets, the capital tax offsets these distortions
in the composition of saving. Since capital income taxes distort the overall level of saving,
the optimal capital tax strikes a balance between distorting the composition and the level of
saving. Indeed, the government faces a fundamental trade-off between efficiency in human
capital formation and allocative efficiency in the intertemporal allocation of consumption.
The optimal tax rate on capital income is relatively large compared to the tax on labor
income if aggregate saving is inelastic compared to learning, so that learning distortions
dominate saving distortions.
Optimal taxes on capital are positive because the government cannot employ subsidies
or tax deductions for human capital investments to offset all the distortions of the labor
1In life-cycle models with heterogenous households, Ordover and Phelps (1979) and, Atkinson and Sandmo
(1980) showed earlier that the optimal capital tax is zero if leisure is weakly separable from consumption.
2The literature on the optimal taxation of capital income typically abstracts from human capital accu-
mulation. See Boskin (1975) and Heckman (1976) for earlier treatments of the effects of capital income taxes
on human capital formation. These treatments are not put in an optimal tax setting.
3All the papers mentioned, including our own, assume that the government can commit to announced
policies. A lack of commitment can also result in positive capital income taxes (see Kydland and Prescott,
1980; and, Fischer, 1980). We show that capital income taxes are optimally positive even if the government
can credibly commit to tax policies.
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income tax on human capital formation. Non-verifiability of human capital investments
excludes these more direct instruments. Non-verifiability of learning is analogous to the non-
verifiable nature of work effort in the optimal tax literature.4 Direct educational expenditures
on books, computers and traveling are important examples of non-verifiable investments
in human capital. Moreover, costs of effort while enrolled in education, such as studying
hard, sacrificing leisure activities, preparing exams, are important immaterial costs that the
government cannot verify easily.5 In contrast, the indirect costs of education, forgone labor
earnings while enrolled in education, are in effect deductible from labor taxation as lower
labor earnings reduce the labor tax bill. Tuition costs, however, cannot be deducted for
income-tax purposes in many countries, so that these costs are effectively non-verifiable.
We demonstrate that the government optimally taxes capital if at least some investments
in human capital are non-verifiable. Only if it can verify all investments in education (so
that it can subsidize these costs), the government does not have to rely on capital income
taxes to alleviate the labor tax distortions on learning. Distortions in the aggregate level
of saving can thus be avoided. This rather special ‘knife-edge’ case explains the findings of
some recent papers that the optimal capital tax is zero in the presence of human capital
accumulation (see Judd 1999; and Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2001).6 Trostel (1993) estimates
that the share of non-verifiable costs of education approaches as much as one quarter of
total costs, even though he does not include the effort costs of education. Our numerical
simulations show that optimal tax rate on capital income approaches that on labor incomes,
even if non-verifiable investments account for only 20% of total investments in human capital.
The case for substantially positive capital income taxes does not directly depend on the
redistributive preferences of the government. It relies only on the presence of positive labor
income taxes. In our model, distortionary labor taxation increases with a stronger distribu-
tional preference of the government. Hence, in contrast to representative agent models (see,
e.g. Atkinson and Sandmo, 1980; Nielsen and Sørensen, 1997; and Judd, 1999), we do not
have to arbitrarily exclude lump-sum taxes as a policy instrument to prevent the optimal
tax problem from becoming trivial.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes individual behavior.
Section 3 derives optimal tax policy if all educational efforts are non-verifiable. Subsequently,
section 4 introduces verifiable educational efforts, which the government can subsidize. Sec-
tion 5 performs some numerical simulations and demonstrates that a synthetic income tax is
roughly optimal under a wide range of parameter values. Section 6 concludes and discusses
the policy implications of the analysis. Four appendices contain the technical details of our
analysis.
4The literature on optimal labor taxation follows Mirrlees’ (1971) pioneering analysis by assuming that
the government cannot verify work effort and individual ability, thereby excluding individualized lump-sum
taxes.
5Education may also generate immaterial benefits, such as the fun of studying, nicer jobs, additional
status, more freedom of occupational choice, et cetera. Immaterial benefits, however, are typically much less
important than immaterial costs in view of the observed high returns on (higher) education, which exceed
returns on safe investments and approach those on equity. Whereas these high returns can be due to market
failures, they probably also compensate investors for non-pecuniary costs that exceed non-pecuniary benefits
(see also Judd, 2000; and, Palacios-Huerta, 2003).
6Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) assume an exogenously given positive capital tax. If the government would
optimize the capital tax, it would set this tax equal to zero.
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2 The model
2.1 Preferences and technologies
We consider a partial equilibrium three-period life-cycle model without uncertainty. Before-
tax wage rates and interest rates are exogenously fixed.7 A mass of agents with unit measure
lives for three periods. In the first period, agents supply unskilled labor and devote resources
to learning. In the second period, agents supply skilled labor and spend time on leisure,
which can be interpreted as early retirement. Individuals are retired in the third period and
consume all their assets. Perfect capital markets allow individuals to freely transfer resources
across the three periods.8
Individuals are heterogeneous in exogenous ability n. The cumulative distribution of
ability is F (n). f(n) represents the corresponding density function, which is continuously
differentiable and strictly positive on the support [n, n], n, n > 0. The government knows the
distribution of abilities, but does not observe individual ability. Accordingly, it cannot levy
individual-specific lump-sum taxes to redistribute incomes, but must rely on distortionary
taxes instead.
In the first period of their lives, individuals invest en in education. Initially, we assume
that the government cannot observe any of these educational inputs so that it cannot subsi-
dize these investments. Educational investment therefore consists only of direct expenditures
and effort costs. Section 4 shows that our main results continue to hold if verifiable costs
of education are allowed for as long as some non-verifiable costs remain.9 For analytical
convenience, we abstract from first-period consumption and leisure demands.10
Ability n can be viewed as the productivity of education, so that more able individuals
produce more human capital with the same educational effort. The production function for
human capital is homothetic:
hn = nφ(en) ≡ n (en)β , (1)
where hn denotes human capital of agent n. Human capital accumulation exhibits decreasing
returns with respect to educational effort en (i.e., β < 1). Ability and educational invest-
ments are complementary inputs in producing human capital (i.e., ∂
2hn
∂en∂n
= β(en)β−1 ≥ 0).
In the second period, human capital is supplied to the labor market in the form of skilled
labor. Gross second-period labor income zn is the product of the number of efficiency units
of human capital, hn, and hours worked ln, i.e., zn ≡ hnln = nφ(en)ln.11 In the third period,
7The model can thus be viewed as a model of a general equilibrium small open economy in which the
international capital market fixes the real interest rate.
8Cameron and Heckman (2001) and Carneiro and Heckman (2002) argue that liquidity constraints are
only of minor importance empirically.
9Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) explore optimal labor tax and education policies in the presence of both
verifiable and non-verifiable inputs into human capital formation. They abstract, however, from capital
income taxes.
10First-period consumption and leisure do not affect our main result that optimal capital taxes are positive.
The presence of first-period consumption, however, would exacerbate the welfare costs of positive capital
income taxes. Endogenous first-period leisure demands would increase the distortionary costs of the labor
tax. Hence, the effect of first-period consumption and leisure on the optimal structure of labor and capital
taxes is ambiguous.
11With ability defined as the productivity of learning, the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor is normalized
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individuals are retired and finance their consumption by selling the financial assets they have
accumulated in the second period.12
Individuals feature a common, concave, and twice differentiable utility function defined
over consumption in the second period cn1 , leisure `
n ≡ 1− ln, and consumption when retired
cn2 :
u(v(cn1 , c
n
2 ), `
n), (2)
where uc1uc2 , u` > 0, and uc1c1 , uc2c2 , u`` ≤ 0. The sub-utility function v(cn1 , cn2 ) is homothetic
and weakly separable from leisure `n. We employ this particular utility function because
it most clearly shows how endogenous human capital formation affects the optimal capital
income tax. Indeed, with this utility function, the optimal capital income tax would be zero
in the absence of human capital formation (see Bernheim, 2002; and, Erosa and Gervais,
2002).
2.2 Budget constraints
The first-period budget constraint is
−an1 = en. (3)
First-period saving an1 is negative because individuals borrow to finance their education. In
the second period, individuals consume, work, pay off their first-period debts and save for
retirement. Hence, the second-period budget constraint amounts to
cn1 = (1− t)lnnφ(en) +Ran1 − an2 + g, (4)
where R ≡ 1 + (1− τ)r, r stands for the exogenous real interest rate, and τ denotes the tax
rate on capital income. The lump-sum transfer g and the marginal tax rate t characterize
the linear labor tax.
The individual consumes all assets in the third period:
cn2 = Ra
n
2 . (5)
We arrive at the life-time budget constraint by substituting the first-period and third-
period budget constraints (i.e. (3) and (5), respectively) into the second-period budget
constraint (4) to eliminate an1 and a
n
2 :
cn1 +
cn2
R
= (1− t)lnnφ(en)−Ren + g. (6)
at unity. Alternatively, ability n can be interpreted as the skill in second-period work corresponding to the
wage rate per efficiency unit of labor. In that case, φ(en) (instead of nφ(en)) defines the efficiency units of
labor (or human capital) per hour worked. Dur and Teulings (2001) investigate optimal education policies
in a general equilibrium model in which different labor types are imperfect substitutes in labor demand.
12We include a third period to allow high ability agents to save more than low ability agents do. In the
absence of a third period, high ability agents would feature the lowest life-time savings, because they borrow
more than low ability agents to finance their education in the first period. Our main results, however, do
not rely on any particular relationship of financial savings with ability.
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2.3 Individual optimization
Individuals maximize their utilities by choosing cn1 , c
n
2 , `
n, and en, subject to their life-time
budget constraints, and taking the policy instruments of the government as given.13 The
resulting first-order condition for the optimal choice of en amounts to
(1− t)lnnφ′(en) = 1 + (1− τ)r = R. (7)
Marginal benefits of education (the left-hand side) should equal marginal costs (the right-
hand side). The labor tax harms learning by depressing marginal benefits (since φ′′(en) < 0).
The capital income tax, in contrast, boosts education because it raises the present value of
investments in human capital by reducing the rate of return on alternative investments R.
Indeed, capital income taxes induce individuals to substitute human capital for financial
savings in their portfolio of human and financial assets.
The first-order condition for en (7) and the production function of human capital (1)
imply that second-period gross labor income zn is proportional to en:
zn = lnnφ(en) =
R
(1− t)β e
n, (8)
The proportionality factor R/(1− t)β does not depend on ability n and is thus the same for
all agents.
The first-order condition for labor supply amounts to
u`
uc1
= wn ≡ (1− t)nφ(en), (9)
while the Euler equation for savings is
uc1
uc2
= 1 + (1− τ)r = R. (10)
Substituting the link between en and zn (8) into the life-time budget constraint (6), we
find that the discounted value of life-time consumption cn1 +
cn2
R
is linear in gross income (and
in view of (8) also linear in learning):
cn1 +
cn2
R
= (1− β)(1− t)zn + g. (11)
Weak separability between leisure and consumption in utility and homotheticity of v(cn1 , c
n
2 )
imply that the shares of third- and second-period consumption in after-tax labor income do
not depend on ability n, i.e.,
ω ≡ c
n
2/R
(1− β)(1− t)lnnφ(en) + g , (12)
13The government sets policy before agents determine their behavior. In view of its distributional pref-
erences, the government faces an incentive to change its policy after the private sector has accumulated
human and financial capital. The government thus must have access to a commitment technology (e.g., due
to reputational considerations).
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1− ω ≡ c
n
1
(1− β)(1− t)lnnφ(en) + g . (13)
The second-order conditions for a utility maximization imply (see Appendix A)
µn ≡ 1− β(1 + ²n) > 0, (14)
where ²n ≡ ∂ln
∂wn
wn
ln
, denotes the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply with respect to
the after-tax wage wn ≡ (1− t)nφ(en).14 Decreasing returns in human capital accumulation
(β < 1) are not sufficient for the second-order condition to be met because of the positive
feedback between human capital and labor supply. In particular, more learning raises the
wage rate. The associated substitution effect boosts labor supply, which, in turn makes
learning more attractive. In order to prevent corner solutions, decreasing returns in the
production of human capital must offset this positive feedback effect, which rises with the
compensated wage elasticity of labor supply ²n.
2.4 Government
The government taxes labor at rate t and capital incomes at rate τ to finance exogenously
given public spending Λ and the endogenous uniform lump-sum transfer g. The fundamental
informational assumptions are that the government must be able to verify aggregate labor
incomes
∫ n
n
lnnφ(en)dF (n) and aggregate capital incomes
∫ n
n
r
(
an1 +
an2
1+r
)
dF (n).
The government budget constraint reads as∫ n
n
[
tlnnφ(en) + τr
(
an1 +
an2
1 + r
)
− g − Λ
]
dF (n) = 0. (15)
The government budget constraint can be written in terms of t and R by using the first and
third-period households budget constraints (3) and (5) to eliminate an1 and a
n
2 :∫ n
n
[
tlnnφ(en) +Ren +
cn2
R
− (1 + r)en − c
n
2
1 + r
− g − Λ
]
dF (n) = 0. (16)
The government’s budget is fully funded and the government can freely borrow and lend at
the capital market at rate r.15
The government maximizes a social welfare function Γ defined over individuals’ indirect
utilities υ(g, t, R, n):
Γ ≡
∫ n
n
Ψ(υ(g, t, R, n))dF (n), (17)
where Ψ′ > 0, and Ψ′′ ≤ 0. With Ψ′ = 1, the social welfare function is utilitarian.
14The compensated tax elasticity of labor supply (²n/µn) exceeds the compensated wage elasticity of labor
supply ²n. The reason is that the tax rate depresses the after-tax wage rate not only directly by raising the
tax wedge, but also indirectly by reducing human capital investments and thus the before-tax reward for each
additional unit of labor effort ln. We can express the compensated elasticities of the endogenous variables
with respect to the policy parameters in terms of ²n by totally differentiating the first-order conditions (7),
(9), and (10) (see Appendix B for the derivations).
15As in Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), one can interpret our model as the steady state of an overlapping
generation’s economy. In that case, our optimal taxes are equivalent to the optimal taxes of a Pareto efficient
tax reform where the government insulates the existing generations from the transition by employing public-
debt policy.
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3 Optimal taxation
The Lagrangian L for maximizing social welfare is given by
max
{g,t,R}
L =
∫ n
n
Ψ(υ(g, t, R, n)) dF (n) + (18)
η
∫ n
n
[
tnlnφ(en) +Ren +
cn2
R
− (1 + r)en − c
n
2
1 + r
− g − Λ
]
dF (n),
where η represents the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint.
We apply Roy’s lemma (using (6)) to derive the following properties:
∂υ(g, t, R, n)
∂g
= λn, (19)
∂υ(g, t, R, n)
∂t
= −λnlnnφ(en), (20)
∂υ(g, t, R, n)
∂R
= λn
(
−en + c
n
2
R2
)
, (21)
where λn denotes private marginal utility of second-period income for an individual with
ability n.
3.1 Optimal lump-sum transfer
The first-order condition for maximizing the Lagrangian (18) with respect to the lump-sum
transfer g amounts to
∂L
∂g
=
∫ n
n
[
Ψ′λn − η + η∆∂e
n
∂g
+ ηtnφ(en)
∂ln
∂g
+ η
τr
(1 + r)R
∂cn2
∂g
]
dF (n) = 0, (22)
where we used Roy’s lemma (19). ∆ ≡ tnlnφ′(en) − τr = ( t
1−t
)
R − τr represents the total
tax wedge on investments in human capital (where the second equality is derived by using
the first-order condition for learning (7)).
By defining the net social marginal value of income of an individual with ability n (in-
cluding the effect on the tax base)
bn ≡ Ψ
′λn
η
+∆
∂en
∂g
+ tnφ(en)
∂ln
∂g
+
τr
(1 + r)R
∂cn2
∂g
, (23)
we can write first-order condition (22) as
b¯ ≡
∫ n
n
bndF (n) = 1. (24)
The average social marginal benefits of a higher g (i.e., the left-hand side of (24)) should
equal the costs in terms of a higher g (i.e., last the right-hand side of (24)).
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In order to facilitate the discussion of the optimal tax schedules below, we define the
so-called distributional characteristic ξ of labor income
ξ ≡
∫ n
n
(1− bn)zndF (n)∫ n
n
zndF (n)
∫ n
n
bndF (n)
, (25)
as the negative normalized covariance between the social value the government attaches to
income of a particular ability bn and gross second-period labor income zn (see also Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1980)). This covariance coincides with the normalized covariances of the welfare
weights bn with learning en because labor income zn is proportional to education en (see
(8)). A positive distributional characteristic ξ implies that the base of the labor tax is
larger for high-ability agents (who feature relatively low welfare weights) than for low-ability
agents (who feature relatively high welfare weights), so that taxing labor income yields
distributional benefits. The magnitude of the distributional characteristic depends not only
on the correlation between ability and the tax base, but also on the correlation between
ability and the welfare weights. Indeed, a zero distributional characteristic implies either
that the government is not interested in redistribution (so that the welfare weight bn is the
same for all n) or that all ability types feature the same labor income (taxable income is the
same for all n).
3.2 Optimal labor income tax
The first-order condition for maximizing the Lagrangian for social welfare (18) with respect
to t is given by
∂L
∂t
=
∫ n
n
[−Ψ′λnnlnφ(en) + ηnlnφ(en)] dF (n) + (26)∫ n
n
η
[
∆
∂en
∂t
+ tnφ(en)
∂ln
∂t
+
τr
(1 + r)R
∂cn2
∂t
]
dF (n) = 0,
where we used Roy’s lemma (20). We substitute the Slutsky equations, and use the definition
of bn (see (23)) to obtain (see Appendix C)
ξ = −∆
R
βε¯et +
(
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
)
ε¯lt (27)
=
∆β
R
(
1 + ²
µ
)
+
(
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
)(
²
µ
)
,
where κ is the degree of homogeneity of the sub-utility function v(cn1 , c
n
2 ), and ε
n
qt ≡ ∂q
n
∂t
1−t
q
(for qn = en, ln, cn2 ) are the compensated elasticities with respect to the labor tax. A bar de-
notes an income-weighted average of a skill-specific variable (i.e., ε¯ ≡ ∫ n
n
εnzndF (n)/
∫ n
n
zndF (n),
where εn is a variable that depends on ability).
The interpretation of the optimal labor tax (27) is as follows. The distributional benefits
of a higher tax rate (ξ) (i.e. the left-hand side of (27)) should correspond to the additional
first-order welfare losses as a result of the higher tax rate (i.e. the right-hand side of (27)).
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These welfare losses arise because of first-order impacts on the learning distortion ∆ and
the labor-supply distortion t
1−t +
τr
(1+r)
ω
κ
. The capital tax τ features in the labor-supply
distortion because the capital tax acts as an implicit tax on labor income by taxing retirement
consumption as one of the uses of second-period labor income. In this way, a capital tax
induces cross-substitution away from second-period consumption towards leisure.
In the absence of capital income taxes (i.e., τ = 0 so that ∆ = t
1−tR), the optimal
marginal tax rate on labor income is
t
1− t =
ξ(
²
µ
)
+ β
(
1+²
µ
) . (28)
This expression illustrates the fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency. If redis-
tributional concerns become more important (as indicated by a larger distributional charac-
teristic ξ), the optimal marginal tax rate rises (ceteris paribus the income-weighted elastic-
ities). The denominator of (28) represents the distortionary costs of redistributive taxation
in terms of the tax elasticity of total labor income. The first income-weighted elasticity(
²
µ
)
= −ε¯lt captures the distortionary effect of the marginal labor tax rate on labor supply
and thus the base of the labor tax. The second term in the denominator β
(
1+²
µ
)
= −βε¯et
stands for the distortion of the labor tax on human-capital accumulation. If large compen-
sated elasticities (in absolute value) indicate that redistributive taxes substantially distort
labor supply and human capital accumulation, positive marginal taxes are costly and the
optimal marginal labor tax is low (ceteris paribus the distributional characteristic ξ).
Expression (28) indicates that endogenous human capital formation (β > 0) raises the
effective elasticity of the tax base in two distinct ways.16 First, due to positive feedback effects
with labor supply, endogenous learning raises the absolute value of the effective elasticity of
labor supply (−ε¯lt ≡ ²µ) by lowering µn ≡ 1−β(1+ ²n). Second, labor taxes distort not only
labor supply but also investments in human capital. The term β
(
1+²
µ
)
captures this latter
distortionary effect.
3.3 Optimal capital income tax
Maximization of social welfare (18) with respect to the capital income tax yields the following
first-order condition:
∂L
∂R
=
∫ n
n
[
Ψ′λn
(
cn2
R2
− en
)
− η
(
cn2
R2
− en
)]
dF (n) + (29)∫ n
n
η
[
∆
∂en
∂R
+ tnφ(en)
∂ln
∂R
+
τr
(1 + r)R
∂cn2
∂R
]
dF (n) = 0,
16With exogenous learning (i.e., β = 0), the model collapses to the standard model of optimal linear
income taxation with endogenous labor supply in which the optimal marginal tax t is given by t1−t =
ξ
² , see
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
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where we used Roy’s lemma (see (21)). Substitution of the Slutsky equations and the defi-
nition of bn (23) yields (see Appendix C)
(ω(1− β)− β)ξ + ∆β
R
(
1− ω²
µ
)
(30)
=
(
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
)
(ω(1− β)− β)
(
²
µ
)
+
τr
(1 + r)
(ω(1− ω)σγ¯) ,
where σ ≡ d log (cn2/cn1 ) /d log(uc1/uc2) denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption and γn ≡ 1−β+ g
(1−t)zn . The factor ω(1−β)−β is the marginal propensity to
save out of life-time labor income. In particular, a large share of retirement consumption ω
implies that a considerable part of second-period labor income is saved for retirement, while
a small elasticity of learning (β) reduces borrowing in the first period to finance education.
If ω(1 − β) > β, the marginal saving quote is positive and individuals with higher ability
thus save most because they feature the highest labor income. Hence, by reducing the return
on saving, the capital income tax yields positive distributional benefits as captured by the
first term at the left-hand side of (30). The second term at the left-hand side stands for
the welfare effect of a higher capital income tax on the tax wedge on human capital ∆
(note that β
(
1−ω²
µ
)
= −βε¯eR > 0 (see Appendix B) because a higher capital tax stimulates
learning). The first term at the right-hand side of (30) represents the welfare effects of capital
income taxation in terms of exacerbating the labor-supply distortion t
1−t +
τr
(1+r)
ω
κ
, where the
compensated labor supply elasticity with respect to the after-tax return on financial savings
is (ω(1 − β) − β)
(
²
µ
)
= ε¯lR, see Appendix B). The sign of this compensated elasticity
is ambiguous. While a higher capital tax harms labor supply by taxing the use of labor
income for retirement consumption, it boosts labor supply by stimulating human capital
accumulation. The second term at right-hand side of (30) stands for the welfare losses of
a higher capital tax in terms of exacerbating distortions in the intertemporal allocation of
consumption (given a positive tax wedge τr
(1+r)
> 0 and a positive intertemporal substitution
elasticity σ > 0).
In the absence of a labor income tax (i.e., t = 0 so that ∆ = τr), the optimal capital
income tax can be written as
τr
(1 + r)
=
(ω(1− β)− β)ξ
ω
κ
(ω(1− β)− β)
(
²
µ
)
+ β(1+r)
R
(
1−ω²
µ
)
+ ω(1− ω)γ¯σ
. (31)
Capital must thus be taxed for redistributive reasons if the rich save more than the poor
(i.e., ω(1 − β) > β). The optimal capital income tax rises with the distributional gains as
captured by the numerator at the right-hand side of (31), and declines with the welfare costs
of capital income taxation. These welfare costs consist of three components represented by
the three terms in the denominator at the right-hand side of (31). These terms represent the
effects of capital income taxation on, respectively, labor supply, human capital accumulation,
and the intertemporal allocation of consumption. As regards the labor-supply effect, if the
rich save more (i.e., ω(1− β) > β), a higher capital tax depresses labor supply because the
additional tax burden on third-period consumption imposed by the capital tax (represented
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by the term ω(1 − β)) dominates lower educational costs as a result of the capital tax
increasing the net present value of investments in human capital (represented by the term
β). This labor supply effect is substantial if the labor supply elasticity
(
²
µ
)
is large. As far
as learning is concerned, if the learning elasticity β
(
1−ω²
µ
)
= −βε¯eR is large, capital income
taxes induce substantial excessive learning by reducing the opportunity costs of education.
Finally, concerning the third component of the welfare costs of capital income taxation, a
large intertemporal substitution elasticity σ raises the intertemporal distortions of capital
taxes on the intertemporal allocation of consumption.
3.4 Optimal dual income tax
If the government can optimally set both the labor income tax and the capital tax, we can
combine the two first-order conditions (27) and (30) to obtain (see Appendix C)
∆β
R
=
τr
(1 + r)
ω∗γ¯σ, (32)
where ω∗ ≡ ω(1−ω)
1+ω
> 0. This expression clearly shows the role of the optimal capital income
tax in alleviating learning distortions imposed by the labor income tax. The optimal capital
income tax is zero if human capital formation is not distorted by the labor tax (i.e. t = 0
so that ∆ = −τr). The government optimally employs positive capital income taxes only if
positive labor taxes distort learning (i.e., if t > 0 and thus ∆ > 0). In that case, by raising
the net present value of investments in human capital, a positive capital income tax alleviates
the tax distortions imposed by the labor income tax. At the same time, however, a capital
income tax distorts the intertemporal allocation of consumption. At small capital income
taxes, however, these welfare costs associated with distorted saving behavior are only second
order, while the welfare benefits of alleviating the learning distortion are first order. Hence,
the introduction of a small capital income tax enhances welfare. At the optimal capital
tax, the additional welfare benefits of a higher capital income tax in terms of stimulating
distorted learning (i.e. the left-hand side of (32)) balance the additional welfare costs in
terms of a more distorted intertemporal allocation of consumption (i.e. the right-hand side
of (32)). The optimal capital tax thus trades off production efficiency in the composition
of saving (i.e., a level playing field between financial and human capital) against allocative
efficiency in the level of saving.
Using ∆ = t
1−tR− τr, we find the optimal structure of capital and labor taxes from (32):
τr
(1 + r)
=
t
1− t
(
(1 + r)
R
+
ω∗γ¯σ
β
)−1
. (33)
The capital tax is thus relatively low compared to the labor tax if saving is elastic (large σ)
compared to learning (small β). In that case, labor taxes impose only small distortions on
learning while capital taxes substantially distort saving.
Substituting the learning distortion (32) to eliminate ∆ from the first-order condition
for t (27) and subsequently substituting the optimal tax structure (33) into the result to
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eliminate t
1−t , we derive the optimal capital income tax
τr
1 + r
=
ξ(
²
µ
)(
1+r
R
+ ω
∗γ¯σ
β
+ ω
κ
)
+ β
(
1+²
µ
)
ω∗γ¯σ
β
. (34)
Capital income is thus taxed at positive rates even if the rich do not save more than the
poor. In the absence of a labor income tax, the factor ω(1 − β) − β, which measures the
correlation between skill and saving, determines the sign of the optimal capital income tax
(see (31)). However, this factor does not enter the expression for the optimal capital income
tax if the government can also optimally set the labor income tax (see (34)). In the latter
case, the distributional characteristic of labor rather than capital incomes determines the
optimal capital tax. Thus, even if the capital tax is regressive (i.e. ω(1 − β) − β < 0), the
government relies more heavily on the capital tax if distributional considerations become
more pressing as indicated by a larger distributional characteristic ξ.
The reason for this seemingly paradoxical result is that the capital tax is not an efficient
instrument for redistributing incomes if the government can also employ a labor tax. With
weakly separable and homothetic preferences, saving is proportional to labor income so that
a tax on saving in fact acts as a tax on additional labor earnings. A capital tax thus does
not redistribute more effectively than the labor tax, while it causes an additional distortion,
namely on the intertemporal allocation of consumption. Furthermore, since consumption
and leisure are (weakly) separable, the capital tax does not reduce overall labor supply
distortions by serving as an implicit tax on leisure. Hence, the labor income tax is aimed at
redistributing income, while the capital tax is targeted solely at alleviating the distortions
of the labor income tax on human capital formation.
Whereas by itself a capital tax may be regressive, together with the labor tax it enhances
redistribution by alleviating the learning distortions of the labor tax. The intuition is that
the labor tax, combined with the capital tax, becomes a more effective instrument to tax
the rents from ability. The combination of capital taxes and labor taxes therefore results in
larger redistribution of incomes and contributes to more equality, even if the capital tax is
regressive. Indeed, the direct regressive impact of the capital tax is more than offset by a
more progressive labor tax.
Substitution of (34) into (33) to eliminate τ yields the following expression for the optimal
labor tax
t
1− t =
ξ(
²
µ
)(
1 + ω/κ1+r
R
+ω
∗γ¯σ
β
)
+ β
(
1+²
µ
)( ω∗γ¯σ
β
(1+r)
R
+ω
∗γ¯σ
β
) . (35)
Both labor and capital income are thus optimally taxed at positive marginal tax rates, which
rise with the distributional characteristic ξ.
The overall tax wedge on labor supply t
1−t +
τr
(1+r)
ω
κ
amounts to (use (34) and (35))
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
=
ξ(
²
µ
)
+ βχ
(
1+²
µ
) , (36)
where 0 < χ ≡
ω∗γ¯σ
β
ω∗γ¯σ
β
+( (1+r)R +
ω
κ )
< 1. Comparison of (36) with the overall tax distortion on
labor supply in the absence of a capital income tax (28) reveals how the availability of the
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capital tax raises the optimal overall labor tax t
1−t +
τr
(1+r)
ω
κ
by alleviating the associated dis-
tortionary costs on learning through the factor χ. In fact, without intertemporal distortions
(σ = 0), the capital tax completely eliminates the learning distortions (i.e., χ = 0). With
large intertemporal distortions compared to learning distortions, in contrast, the capital tax
does not help much in reducing distortions in human capital formation. Indeed, the efficacy
of the capital tax in alleviating learning distortions depends on the intertemporal substitu-
tion elasticity σ, which determines the sensitivity of the level of saving, compared to the
learning elasticity β, which determines the sensitivity of the composition of saving.
The optimal overall tax wedge (36) is lower if behavior becomes more sensitive to taxes.
In particular, ceteris paribus the distributional characteristic, optimal taxes decline with
the wage elasticity of labor supply ²n, the learning elasticity β (both reduce µn) and the
intertemporal substitution elasticity σ. By raising the labor-supply distortions associated
with the labor tax, a higher wage elasticity of labor supply ²n reduces the optimal labor
tax and therefore the need for capital taxes to alleviate the distortions of the labor tax
on learning. By boosting the costs of employing the capital tax to alleviate the learning
distortions imposed by the labor tax, a higher intertemporal substitution elasticity σ reduces
the optimal labor supply wedge t
1−t+
τr
(1+r)
ω
κ
, as the optimal capital tax can correct for only a
small part of the labor tax distortions on learning. Redistribution thus becomes more costly
and the optimal tax wedge declines, ceteris paribus.
Whereas all behavioral margins reduce the overall tax wedge (36), only the learning and
saving margin affect the composition of the tax burden (33). The wage elasticities of labor
supply ²n do not impact the composition of the tax burden over labor and capital taxes, since
shifting the tax burden from labor to capital income taxes will not reduce the distortions
in leisure demand (due to (weakly) separable preferences and a constant marginal saving
quote).
The impact of the behavioral margins can be illustrated with three special cases. In
each of these cases, one of the three behavioral margins (labor supply, learning, or the
intertemporal allocation of consumption) does not operate. Exogenous learning (β = 0)
implies a zero optimal capital income tax (τ = 0). This is a familiar result from the standard
model of optimal linear labor taxation with weakly separable utility (2), which is homothetic
in consumption (see e.g., Bernheim (2002)). The optimal linear labor tax is then
t
1− t =
ξ
²¯
. (37)
In the absence of intertemporal substitution in consumption (i.e., σ = 0), the capital
income tax can costlessly accomplish production efficiency in learning (i.e., ∆ = 0 and
t
1−t =
τr
R
). The optimal overall tax wedge is given by
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
=
ξ(
²
µ
) . (38)
In this case, the capital income tax allows the government to tax the infra-marginal rents of
learning at zero costs, even though learning efforts are non-verifiable. Tax rates, however,
remain finite because the labor tax continues to distort labor supply. Endogenous learning
raises the effective elasticity of the tax base only by increasing the absolute value of the
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effective elasticity of labor supply
(
²
µ
)
, because the learning elasticity β
(
1+²
µ
)
drops out of
the denominator of (38) (compare (38) with (36)).
Exogenous labor supply (²n = 0) does not directly affect the optimal tax structure (33)
but only raises overall tax levels. The case for taxing capital income thus depends on
endogenous learning (β > 0) rather than endogenous labor supply. The overall tax level
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
=
ξ(1− β)
βχ
, (39)
remains finite because the labor tax causes learning distortions, which can be offset by the
capital tax only at the cost of distortions in savings (with σ > 0 and thus χ > 0).
4 Verifiable investment in human capital
This section explores how verifiable educational efforts, which can be subsidized by the gov-
ernment, affect our results. Time invested in education is arguably the most important
verifiable investment in human capital, since forgone earnings are tax deductible and enroll-
ment in (higher) education is widely subsidized across the Western world. In the presence
of subsidies on education, the government has access to a direct instrument to offset the
learning distortions caused by the labor tax. This raises the question whether the govern-
ment still wants to rely on the indirect instrument of the capital income tax to alleviate the
labor-tax distortions on human capital.
To anwer this question, let educational efforts en consist of both a verifiable part xn
and a non-verifiable part yn. xn can be interpreted as the years spent in formal education
and yn as direct costs and monetized effort costs. The verifiable input xn is tax-deductible
while after-tax expenditures are subsidized at rate s so that the marginal cost of investing
xn amounts to (1− t)(1− s)px.
xn and yn produce aggregate investment in human capital en through a constant-returns-
to-scale sub-production function ψ:
en ≡ ψ(xn, yn), (40)
where ψx, ψy > 0; ψxx, ψyy ≤ 0 and ψxy ≥ 0. Hence, the production function for human
capital (1) becomes
hn = nφ(en) ≡ n (ψ(xn, yn))β . (41)
The household budget constraint is now given by
cn1 +
cn2
R
= (1− t)lnnφ(ψ(xn, yn))−R[(1− t)(1− s)pxxn + pyyn] + g, (42)
where px and py denote the exogenous prices of x
n and yn, respectively. px can be interpreted
as foregone unskilled labor earnings when learning.17
17If we interpret (1 − t)pxxn as the taxed foregone earnings of an unskilled worker, we may add a (net)
endowment of unskilled labor, (1 − t)px, to the household budget constraint – where we normalized the
endowment of unskilled labor time to unity. xn then denotes the fraction of unskilled labor time invested
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The first-order conditions for maximizing utility with respect to the two educational
inputs xn and yn amount to
lnnφ′(.)ψx(xn, yn) = R(1− s)px, (43)
(1− t)lnnφ′(.)ψy(xn, yn) = Rpy. (44)
The tax rate t does not enter (43) because tax deductibility of xn implies that the tax rate
equally reduces the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of verifiable learning xn. The
subsidy s boosts investments of verifiable inputs xn. In the case of non-verifiable learning,
in contrast, the tax rate directly reduces only the benefits and leaves the costs unaffected
(see (44)).
The first-order conditions for xn (43) and yn (44), and the production function of human
capital (41) imply that gross labor income zn is proportional to both xn and yn:
zn = lnnφ(en) =
(1− s)px
αβ
xn, (45)
zn = lnnφ(en) =
py
(1− α)β(1− t)y
n. (46)
The proportionality factors do not depend on ability n, because the shares of xn and yn in hu-
man capital investment, α ≡ xnψx
ψ
= (1−t)(1−s)pxx
n
(1−t)(1−s)pxxn+pyyn and 1−α ≡
ynψy
ψ
= pyy
n
(1−t)(1−s)pxxn+pyyn ,
are the same for all agents (see Appendix B).
The government budget constraint is now given by∫ n
n
[t (nlnφ(en)− (1− s)pxxn(1 + r))] dF (n) + (47)∫ n
n
[
τr
(
cn2
R(1 + r)
− (1− s)(1− t)pxxn − pyyn
)]
dF (n)
=
∫ n
n
[(1 + r)spxx
n + g + Λ] dF (n).
4.1 Optimal education subsidies
If the government simultaneously optimizes over the labor tax and the educational subsidy,
the optimal educational subsidy satisfies (see Appendix D)
s+ τr
R
(1− s)(1− t) =
(
(1− α)(1− ρ)
1− (1− α)(1− ρ)
)
∆
R
, (48)
where ρ ≡ d log
(
xn
yn
)
/d log(ψy
ψx
) stands for the elasticity of substitution between xn and yn in
the composite of aggregate investment in human capital en (40). This expression shows the
in education. The additional term in the budget constraint, (1− t)px, implies that changes in t give rise to
additional income effects. As long as the government can optimally set g, these additional income effects do
not affect any of the main results derived below. For notational convenience, we abstract from this additional
term in the household budget constraint.
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optimal relationship between the subsidy wedge on verifiable investments in human capital,
s + τr
R
, and the tax wedge on non-verifiable investments in human capital, ∆
R
≡ t
1−t − τrR .
A capital income tax τ > 0 reduces the tax wedges on verifiable and non-verifiable learning
alike. An education subsidy s > 0, in contrast, decreases only the tax wedge on verifiable
learning, while a labor tax t > 0 increases only the tax wedge on non-verifiable learning.
To interpret (48), we first consider the case in which the capital income tax is zero and
the labor income tax is positive (i.e., τ = 0, t > 0). In that case, an education subsidy
s > 0 alleviates the distortionary effect of the labor tax (t > 0) on aggregate learning.
At the same time, however, a subsidy exacerbates the distortions of the labor tax on the
composition of learning. In particular, the labor tax system boosts the demand for xn at
the expense of yn because only xn is tax deductible. By further reducing the effective cost
of tax deductible inputs, an education subsidy results in even more substitution away from
yn to the tax deductible inputs xn. The sign of the optimal education subsidy depends on
the relative strengths of these two effects on the aggregate level and composition of learning.
A large substitution elasticity (ρ > 1) implies that tax distortions on the composition of
learning dominate tax distortions on the aggregate level of learning. Hence, tax-deductible
investments should be taxed so as to combat substitution between the two educational inputs
on account of the tax deductibility of verifiable inputs. In contrast, if individuals cannot
easily substitute yn for xn (i.e., ρ < 1), xn is subsidized rather than taxed because subsidizing
the observed input xn helps to offset the distortionary effect of the labor tax on aggregate
learning.
In the presence of a capital tax, (48) shows that the composite tax wedge on verifiable
learning −(s + τr
R
) and that on non-verifiable learning t
1−t − τrR have the same sign if and
only if the substitution elasticity between the two educational inputs exceeds unity. In the
extreme case that inputs in education are perfectly substitutable (i.e., ρ → ∞), taxes on
verifiable education completely offset the distortionary effects of the tax-deductibility of only
verifiable learning on the composition of learning, so that the tax wedges on both types of
learning are the same, i.e., −s/(1− s) = t. In this case, the presence of verifiable inputs does
not reduce the learning distortion compared to the case in which all investments in human
capital are non-verifiable.
With a substitution elasticity ρ smaller than one, in contrast, a subsidy on verifiable
learning should optimally offset the adverse impact on aggregate learning of the tax wedge on
non-verifiable learning t
1−t− τrR . If a positive tax wedge on non-verifiable learning t1−t− τrR > 0
depresses aggregate investment in human capital, a subsidy on verifiable learning is called
for to boost aggregate investment in human capital. Without any substitution between the
two inputs (i.e., ρ = 0), the government can costlessly offset all distortions of non-zero taxes
on non-verifiable learning by offsetting subsidies on verifiable learning.
If the production function for aggregate learning is Cobb-Douglas (ρ = 1), verifiable
learning is taxed in the presence of a positive capital tax τ. Intuitively, the education tax
s = − τr
R
< 0 offsets the implicit education subsidy implied by the capital income tax reducing
the opportunity costs of learning. This case for a tax on learning is similar to Nielsen and
Sørensen (1997), who argue that the government should tax human capital formation in the
presence of a capital income tax.
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4.2 Optimal labor taxation
If the government can freely set the educational subsidy, the optimal labor tax is determined
by the following first-order condition (see Appendix D)
ξ =
∆βθ
R
(
1 + ²
µ
)
+
(
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
)(
²
µ
)
, (49)
where 0 ≤ θ ≡ ρ(1−α)
α+ρ(1−α) ≤ 1. θ measures the extent to which education subsidies eliminate
the tax wedge on learning. If θ is small (large), education subsidies are a powerful (weak)
instrument to alleviate the tax distortions on learning. Compared to the corresponding
expression without verifiable learning (i.e., α = 0 (and θ = 1), see (27)), the learning distor-
tion is reduced, since θ < 1. The intuition is that the additional subsidy instrument allows
the government to alleviate the distortions of the labor tax on human capital formation.
Education subsidies largely eliminate the learning distortions if the share of non-verifiable
learning in aggregate learning (1− α) and the substitution elasticity between verifiable and
non-verifiable learning ρ are small.
With a Leontief production function of human capital (ρ = 0 and θ = 0), the government
can completely offset the tax distortions on non-verifiable learning yn by subsidizing verifiable
inputs xn. The reason is that the government can indirectly subsidize non-verifiable inputs
yn by subsidizing verifiable inputs xn without inducing substitution away from yn towards
xn. With non-zero substitution between the two inputs (ρ > 0), however, the government
cannot costlessly mimic a subsidy on yn by subsidizing xn, because subsidizing xn distorts the
composition of human capital accumulation towards excessive use of xn. Hence, the learning
distortion of the labor tax is not reduced to zero. In the extreme case of infinite substitution
between the two inputs into human capital formation (i.e., ρ→∞), the presence of verifiable
inputs does not reduce the learning distortion compared to the case in which all inputs are
non verifiable. Indeed, in this case, the government finds it optimal to tax xn (i.e., s < 0) so
as make xn effectively non-tax deductible. This ensures a level playing field with yn. With
Cobb Douglas production of aggregate learning (i.e., ρ = 1), θ corresponds to the share of
non-verifiable inputs in aggregate investment in human capital (1− α). θ is larger (smaller)
than (1−α) if the substitution elasticity between the inputs ρ is larger (smaller) than unity.
The formula for the optimal marginal tax on labor income in the absence of capital
income taxes (i.e., τ = 0 so that ∆ = t
1−tR) becomes
t
1− t =
ξ(
²
µ
)
+ βθ
(
1+²
µ
) . (50)
Ceteris paribus the distributional characteristic ξ and the labor supply elasticities ²n, the
presence of educational subsidies for verifiable learning raises the optimal labor tax since
θ < 1.
4.3 Optimal capital taxation
If the government has free access to not only the labor tax t and the subsidy on investments
in human capital s, but also the capital income tax τ , the first-order condition for the optimal
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capital tax can be written as (see Appendix D)
(ω(1− β)− β)ξ + ∆βθ
R
(
1− ω²
µ
)
(51)
=
(
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
)
(ω(1− β)− β)
(
²
µ
)
+
τr
(1 + r)
(ω(1− ω)σγ¯) .
Also in this first-order condition, the availability of education subsidies reduces effective
learning distortion through the additional multiplicative factor 0 ≤ θ ≡ ρ(1−α)
α+ρ(1−α) ≤ 1.
Otherwise, the expression for the optimal capital tax is the same as derived before with only
non-verifiable investments in human capital, see equation (30).
4.4 Optimal dual income tax
Combining the two first-order conditions (49) and (51), we obtain the (see Appendix D)
∆βθ
R
=
τr
(1 + r)
ω∗γ¯σ, (52)
which yields the optimal dual tax structure (using ∆ = t
1−tR− τr)
τr
(1 + r)
=
t
1− t
(
(1 + r)
R
+
ω∗σγ¯
βθ
)−1
, (53)
and the optimal overall tax wedge on labor supply
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
=
ξ(
²
µ
)
+ βχθ
(
1+²
µ
) . (54)
Compared to the case without verifiable learning, subsidized verifiable learning in effect
reduces the elasticity of human capital investment β to θβ (compare (52) with (32), (53)
with (33), and (54) with (36)). Optimal capital taxes thus remain positive (τ > 0). The
only exception is the case in which education subsidies do not distort the composition of
learning and can thus costlessly eliminate the entire labor-tax distortion on human capital
accumulation (θ = 0). This is the case only if either substitution between verifiable and
non-verifiable learning is completely absent (ρ = 0) or all learning is verifiable (α = 1).
Indeed, the analysis in section 3 remains valid, except that verifiable learning introduces
an additional behavioral margin: substitution between verifiable and non-verifiable learning.
Just as the other behavioral margins, more elastic behavior on account of a higher substitu-
tion elasticity ρ reduces the optimal overall tax wedge (54). Moreover, just as the aggregate
learning and saving margin, the learning composition margin affects the composition of the
tax burden (53). In particular, the capital tax becomes a more important instrument for
alleviating the labor-tax distortions on learning if a high elasticity ρ renders the educational
subsidy a relatively inefficient instrument to offset these learning distortions.
With verifiable learning, the government has two instruments at its disposal to offset
the labor tax distortion on human capital accumulation: education subsidies and capital
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income taxes. Both these instruments are imperfect, however, as they distort either the
composition of learning (in the case of education subsidies) or aggregate saving (in the
case of the capital income tax). At the optimum, the government balances distortions on
aggregate learning with those on the composition of learning and the intertemporal allocation
of saving. By optimally balancing these three distortions, the government contains the costs
of redistribution.
5 Numerical simulations
To further check the robustness of our results to the presence of verifiable investments in
human capital, this section quantifies optimal capital income taxes by using expression (53)
for the optimal dual income tax structure. We can employ this expression assuming that
governments optimized the labor tax (t) and the amount of income redistribution (g).18 One
should interpret our findings with some caution as our simple three-period life-cycle structure
abstracts from several real-world complications, such as bequests and risk.
In order to compute the optimal capital tax, we adopt a rate of return r on financial
investments featuring similar (risk) characteristics as investments in human capital. Since
human capital is riskier than governments bonds, a real rate of return of 6% per annum is
assumed.19 In our three-period life-cycle model, each period captures a third of the average
overall life-span. Hence, we adopt a cohort length of 25 years.
Expression (53) contains three share parameters: α, ω, and γ¯. The share of observable
costs in total educational expenditure is set at α = 0.5. Becker (1964) and Boskin (1975)
find that the share of goods invested in education is about one-quarter and the share of (tax
deductible) forgone earnings amounts to three-quarters. We do not set α to 0.75, however,
because this would ignore the effort cost of education (i.e., attending college, studying,
etc). The share of retirement consumption in total consumption is set at ω = 0.33. Finally,
to compute γ¯, we adopt an average ratio of lump-sum transfers to gross labor incomes of
g/z = 0.25.
As regards the three relevant behavioral elasticities in (53) (i.e., σ, β, and ρ), the largest
empirical literature exists on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption σ.
Whereas older papers found extremely small elasticities, more recent work (e.g., Hall (1988)
and Attanasio and Weber (1995)) suggests that the intertemporal substitution elasticity is
substantially positive at around σ = 0.5.20 Trostel (1993) contains an extensive discussion
on plausible parameter values for the returns to inputs invested in human capital β. Based
on this, we set β = 0.5.21 Concerning the elasticity of substitution between inputs in the
18The exogenously given revenue requirement Λ balances the budget.
19Estimated Mincer returns on education typically exceed 6%, see e.g. Ashenfelter et al. (1999). In
analogy of the equity premium puzzle, this raises the so-called human capital risk premium puzzle, see Judd
(2000).
20This value may be on the high side for a three-period model with periods of about 20 years in which
intraperiod intertemporal substitution is in effect infinite. A lower value for σ would strengthen the case for
large capital taxes further.
21The second-order conditions for individual utility maximization imply β(1+ ²n) < 1. With the compen-
sated wage elasticity of labor supply ²n taking an empirically plausible value of 0.5, β should be smaller than
0.67 for the second-order conditions to be met.
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human capital formation ρ, we follow Trostel (1993) by using ρ = 1 as the benchmark value.
Hence, the production function if aggregate learning is Cobb-Douglas.
Figure 1 shows the optimal capital income taxes at given labor income taxes for the
benchmark values of the parameters. Quite surprisingly, a synthetic income tax, which taxes
capital and labor incomes at the same marginal rates, appears to be roughly optimal. In
order to check whether this result is robust, Figures 2 – 9 perform extensive sensitivity
analyses. The results are most sensitive to the real return on financial savings r. Capital
income taxes are substantially larger than labor income taxes if the real rate of return r and
the cohort length are lower than 6% and 25 years (see Figures 2 and 3). Intuitively, the
aggregate capital income from financial saving is lower in this case so that the tax rate has
to be higher to yield the same net implicit subsidy on learning.
As regards the behavioral elasticities, the optimality of a synthetic income tax is only
violated if the elasticity of substitution in consumption (σ) substantially exceeds unity or
the elasticity of human capital formation β and the elasticity of substitution between inputs
in education ρ are smaller than 0.2 (see Figures 4, 5 and 6). These are rather extreme
parameter values that substantially deviate from empirically estimated values. Hence, the
result that optimal capital income taxes substantially exceed zero is quite robust.
The results are also not very sensitive to the shares parameters (see figures 7, 8 and 9).
The case for a positive capital tax becomes substantially weaker only if the share of verifiable
inputs in learning α exceeds 0.9. The shares of retirement consumption ω and lump-sum
government transfers hardly affect the results. Overall, the numerical calculations suggest
that optimal marginal capital income taxes are positive and quite close to the marginal tax
rate on labor.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigated the interactions between labor markets, capital markets and human
capital investments in a second-best world in which the government engages in redistribution
without being able to verify work and learning efforts. In order to investigate optimal linear
taxes on labor and capital incomes, we developed a three-period life-cycle model of human
capital investment, financial saving and labor supply in which individuals exhibit different
abilities to learn. We demonstrated that a dual income tax with positive marginal tax rates
on both labor and capital income is optimal, even if preferences are homothetic and weakly
separable in leisure and consumption (these latter conditions imply an optimal zero capital
tax in the absence of human capital formation). The reason why positive capital income
taxes are nevertheless optimal is that these taxes are a second-best instrument to alleviate
the labor-tax distortions on human capital accumulation. Accordingly, if a government sets
large marginal labor tax rates for redistributional reasons, it should also levy large tax rates
on capital income in order to combat the adverse impact of high marginal labor taxes on
learning.
The optimal marginal tax on capital income is large compared to the optimal marginal tax
on labor income if the level and composition of learning efforts are relatively elastic compared
to aggregate saving. Education subsidies on verifiable educational inputs reduce the need for
capital taxes to boost learning but do not eliminate the case for positive capital taxes. The
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optimal capital tax is zero only in knife-edge cases in which non-verifiable learning is either
completely absent or is directly tied to verifiable learning. In these limiting cases, education
subsidies are a perfect instrument to eliminate all labor-tax distortions on human capital
accumulation so that positive capital taxes are no longer needed. Numerical simulations
reveal that optimal capital taxes are substantially positive for a wide variety of plausible
parameterizations. In fact, a synthetic income tax, which taxes capital and labor incomes
at the same marginal rates, appears to be roughly optimal. Hence, the welfare gains of
replacing income taxes by consumption taxes are over-estimated if human capital formation
is ignored.22
The case for positive capital taxes rests on efficiency concerns rather than its direct
redistributional effects. In fact, the optimal capital tax remains positive even if the capital
tax itself is regressive. Intuitively, with separable preferences, the labor tax is a more efficient
instrument to redistribute resources than the capital tax is. The labor tax is therefore
targeted at redistribution, while the capital tax is aimed solely at alleviating the learning
distortions imposed by the labor income tax. As a direct consequence, the marginal tax rate
on capital income is directly tied to the tax rate on labor income because a larger labor tax
rate calls for a larger capital tax to alleviate the additional distortions on human capital
accumulation. The capital tax therefore rises with the inequality in labor incomes rather
than that in capital incomes.
Our paper is not only of theoretical interest but has policy relevance as well. In modern
economies, human capital is viewed as one of the main engines of growth. At the same
time, governments seek to promote private saving in order to alleviate future pressures on
government budgets in aging societies. Moreover, governments increasingly rely on in-work
tax credits targeted at low-skilled workers in order to strengthen the labor-market position
of these workers. This paper stresses the fundamental trade-offs between the three objec-
tives of boosting human capital formation, increasing financial saving, and redistributing
resources towards low-skilled labor. Given the redistributional objectives of the government,
more incentives for financial savings harm human capital accumulation. Moreover, if the
government improves the employment prospects of the low skilled through more redistrib-
utive labor taxation, the government should move part of the tax burden from the labor
market to the capital market in order to alleviate the distortionary effects of higher marginal
labor taxes on human capital formation, even though higher capital taxes discourage private
saving.
In future research, we want to explore the consequences of general equilibrium effects on
wages and interest rates in a multi-period setting, possibly with a representative infinitely
lived agent with capital and human capital stocks evolving dynamically over time. We also
intend to explore the optimal non-linear taxes on labor incomes and perhaps also on capital
incomes for the case in which the government is able to observe individual incomes rather
than just the aggregates. This requires the analysis of incentive compatibility constraints.
Another important is extension involves wage rigidities and union power, which can be
viewed as implicit labor taxes excerbating labor-market distortions.
22This point is also stressed by Judd (1999).
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Appendix
Appendix A: Second-order conditions
We employ a three-step budgeting procedure to derive the second-order conditions. In the
first stage, individuals select aggregate consumption vn, labor supply ln (leisure demand
`n = 1 − ln), and aggregate investment in human capital en(≡ ψ(xn, yn)). We write the
individual budget constraint as pnc v
n = (1 − t)nφ(en)ln − Rpeen + g, where the price in-
dices of aggregate consumption and learning are defined as pnc ≡ (cn1 + cn2/R) /v(cn1 , cn2 ) and
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pe ≡ ((1− t)(1− sx)pxxn + pyyn) /en, respectively. In the first part of the paper where all
educational inputs are non-observable, pe is normalized to unity. By employing the individ-
ual budget constraint to eliminate vn from the utility function, we arrive at the following
maximization problem:
max
{ln,en}
u
(
(1− t)nφ(en)ln
pnc
− Rpee
n
pnc
+
g
pnc
, 1− ln
)
, (55)
The first-order conditions for education and labor supply are
(1− t)nlnφ′(en)−Rpe = 0, (56)
uv(1− t)nφ(en)− u`pnc = 0. (57)
The second-order partial derivatives are ordered in the Hessian matrix
H ≡
[
(1− t)nlnφ′′(en) (1− t)nφ′(en)
uv(1− t)nφ′(en) −u`v(1− t)nφ(en) + u``pc
]
. (58)
The Hessian matrix should be negative definite for utility to reach a maximum. The first
principal minor is (1− t)nlnφ′′(en) < 0. Therefore, the second leading principal minor must
be positive. Given the production function φ(en) = (en)β, this implies
β(1 + ²n∗) < 1, (59)
where ²n∗ ≡
(
lull
ul
− luvl
uv
)−1
. To relate this inequality to β(1 + ²n) < 1, we link ²n∗ to the
partial compensated wage elasticity of labor supply ²n. By differentiating the first-order
condition u`
uv
= w
n
pnc
(where wn ≡ (1 − t)nφ(en) is the after-tax wage) with respect to ln
and substituting dv
n
dln
= − ul
uv
(derived by taking the total differential of utility, which is held
constant), we can write the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply ²n as
²n ≡ ∂l
n∗
∂wn
wn
ln∗
=
((
lnuv`
uv
− l
nu``
u`
)
−
(
u`
uv
)(
lnuvv
uv
− l
nuv`
u`
))−1
, (60)
so that (²n)−1 = (²n∗)−1 + δ, where δ ≡ −
(
u`
uv
)(
lnuvv
uv
− lnuv`
u`
)
≥ 0. We thus have ²n ≤ ²n∗
and
β(1 + ²n) ≤ β(1 + ²n∗) < 1. (61)
Therefore, the second-order condition implies the inequality in the text.
In the second stage of the budgeting procedure, individuals maximize v(cn1 , c
n
2 ) subject to
the constraint: pnc v
n = cn1+
cn2
R
. The associated second-order condition, vc1c1vc2c2−(vc1c2)2 > 0,
is satisfied because v(cn1 , c
n
2 ) is strictly concave.
In the third stage, individuals allocate their expenditures on education en over x
n and
yn by maximizing en = ψ(x
n, yn) subject to the expenditure constraint peen = (1 − t)(1 −
sx)pxx
n+pyy
n. Concavity of ψ(xn, yn) implies the resulting second-order condition ψxxψyy−
(ψxy)
2 > 0 is met.
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Appendix B: Compensated elasticities
To find the various compensated behavior elasticities with respect to policy variables, we
multiply the first-order condition for xn (i.e. (43)) by (1 − t)xn, multiply the first-order
condition for yn (i.e. (44)) by yn, and add the results. Using ψxx
n + ψyy
n = ψ(xn, yn) = en
(since ψ(xn, yn) is homogeneous of degree one), we find
β(1− t)nlnφ(en) = Rpeen, (62)
where pe ≡ ((1− t)(1− s)pxxn + pyyn) /en.
Log-linearizing (62) (using φ(en) = (en)β) and the definition of pe (using e
n ≡ ψ(xn, yn)
and the first-order conditions for xn and yn (i.e. (43) and (44)), we arrive at
−t˜+ ln + βe˜n = p˜e + e˜n + R˜, (63)
p˜e = −α(t˜+ s˜), (64)
where a tilde stands for a compensated relative change, except for the tax rate and the
subsidy rates where t˜ ≡ dt/(1 − t) and s˜ ≡ ds/(1 − s). α ≡ xnψx
ψ
= (1−t)(1−s)pxx
n
peen
does not
depend on ability. The reason is that the first-order conditions for xn and yn ((43) and (44))
imply that the marginal rate of transformation does not depend on n:
ψx
ψy
=
(1− t)(1− s)px
py
. (65)
ψx and ψy are functions of x
n/yn only (since ψ(xn, yn) is homogeneous of the first degree).
Hence, (65) determines the ratio of the two inputs xn/yn as a function of (1−t)(1−s)px
py
only.
α = (1−t)(1−s)pxx
n
(1−t)(1−s)pxxn+pyyn =
(1−t)(1−s)px(xn/yn)
(1−t)(1−s)px(xn/yn)+py depends therefore only on (1− t)(1− s)px and
py – and not on ability.
The first-order condition for labor supply (57) can be written as
wn
pnc
=
u`
uv
, (66)
where wn ≡ (1− t)nφ(en) and pnc ≡
(
cn1 +
cn2
R
)
/v(cn1 , c
n
2 ). The compensated relative changes
in labor supply ln and composite consumption vn are related as follows (differentiate the
utility function u(vn, 1 − ln) and set the total differential to zero): (uvvn/u`ln)v˜n = l˜n.
Substitution of the first-order condition for labor supply to eliminate uv yields
γnv˜n = l˜n, (67)
where γn ≡ pnc vn
(1−t)lnnφ(en) =
(1−β)(1−t)lnnφ(en)+g
(1−t)lnnφ(en) = 1 − β + g(1−t)zn (where the second equality
is derived from the definition of pnc ≡
(
cn1 +
cn2
R
)
/v(cn1 , c
n
2 ) and (11)). Log-linearizing the
definition of pnc (i.e. p
n
c v(c
n
1 ; c
n
2 ) = c
n
1 +
cn2
R
), we arrive at
p˜nc = −ωR˜ +
(
1− κ
κ
)
v˜n, (68)
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where κ is the degree of homogeneity of v(cn1 , c
n
2 ) so that
v˜n = κ ((1− ω)c˜n1 + ωc˜n2 ) . (69)
The right-hand side of (66) depends only on ln and vn. Substituting (67) and (68) to
eliminate v˜n and p˜nc from the log-linearized version of (66), we arrive at the following labor-
supply function:
l˜n = ²n(w˜n + ωR˜), (70)
where ²n ≡ ∂ln∗
∂wn
wn
ln∗ is a parameter governing the compensated wage elasticity of second-period
labor supply with respect to the after-tax second-period wage.
Consumption in the two periods is found by log-linearizing (10):
c˜n1 − c˜n2 = −σR˜, (71)
where σ ≡ d log
(
cn1
cn2
)
/d log
(
uc2
uc1
)
is the intertemporal substitution elasticity in consumption.
This elasticity does not depend on ability n. The reason is that the left-hand side of (10)
depends only on cn1/c
n
2 (as the sub-utility function v(c
n
1 , c
n
2 ) is homothetic), so that one can
express cn1/c
n
2 as a function of R only (independent of ability n). Accordingly, the elasticity
σ, which depends on cn1/c
n
2 only, does not depend on ability n.
Substitution of (71) into (69) to eliminate c˜n1 yields (where the second equality follows
from (67)):
c˜n2 =
v˜n
κ
+ (1− ω)σR˜ = l˜
n
κγn
+ (1− ω)σR˜. (72)
Substituting w˜n = −t˜+ βe˜n (which follows from wn ≡ (1− t)nφ(en)) into (70), and then
substituting the result and (64) into (63) to eliminate, respectively, ln and p˜e, we can solve
for e˜n ::
e˜n =
1
µn
(
(α− (1 + ²n))t˜− (1− ω²n)R˜ + αs˜
)
, (73)
where µn ≡ 1− β(1 + ²n) > 0 from the second-order conditions.
Substituting w˜n = −t˜+ βe˜n and (73) into (70), we solve for l˜n:
l˜n =
(
−²
n(1− βα)
µn
)
t˜+
²n
µn
(
αβs˜+ (ω(1− β)− β)R˜
)
. (74)
Substitution of this reduced form into (72) yields
c˜n2 =
²n
µnκγn
(
−(1− βα)t˜+ (ω(1− β)− β)R˜ + αβs˜
)
+ (1− ω)σR˜. (75)
From the last three expressions follow the compensated elasticities of aggregate learning,
labor supply and third-period consumption with respect to the policy variables.
In the first part of the paper, all learning is non verifiable (i.e., α = 0). Hence, the
elasticities of learning, labor supply and third-period consumption follow from (use (63),
(70), and (72) with α = 0):
e˜n = −
(
(1 + ²n)t˜+ (1− ω²n)R˜
µn
)
, (76)
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l˜n =
²n
µn
(
−t˜+ (ω(1− β)− β)R˜
)
, (77)
c˜n2 =
²n
µnκγn
(
−t˜+ (ω(1− β)− β)R˜
)
+ (1− ω)σR˜. (78)
The second part of the paper analyzes α > 0. We find xn and yn by differentiating
en ≡ ψ(xn, yn) and using the first-order conditions for xn and yn to eliminate ψx and ψy to
arrive at
e˜n = αx˜n + (1− α)y˜n. (79)
Differentiation of (65) yields
x˜n − y˜n = ρ(t˜+ s˜), (80)
where ρ ≡ d log
(
xn
yn
)
/d log(ψy
ψx
) stands for the elasticity of substitution between the two
inputs in the production of human capital. This substitution elasticity depends only on x
n
yn
and is independent of ability because x
n
yn
is a function of (1−t)(1−s)px
py
only (see the discussion
above on α being independent of ability). From (79) and (80), we can express x˜ and y˜ in
terms of e˜; substituting (73) to then eliminate e˜, we find:
x˜n =
(α− (1 + ²n))t˜− (1− ω²n)R˜ + αs˜
µn
+ (1− α)ρ(t˜+ s˜), (81)
y˜n =
(α− (1 + ²n))t˜− (1− ω²n)R˜ + αs˜
µn
− αρ(t˜+ s˜). (82)
These expressions yield the elasticities for xn and yn with respect to changes in policy.
Appendix C: Optimal taxation with non-verifiable learning
We can rewrite the first-order condition for t (26) by using the Slutsky equations
∂q
∂t
≡ ∂q
∗
∂t
− nlnφ(en)∂q
∂g
, (83)
where q = en, ln, cn2 . A star denotes a compensated change. Substitution of the Slutsky
terms into (26) and use of the definition of bn (see 23)) results in
∂L
∂t
=
∫ n
n
[(−bn + 1) zn] dF (n) + (84)∫ n
n
[
∆
1− t
en
zn
znεnet +
t
1− tz
nεnlt +
τr
(1 + r)
cn2/R
(1− t)zn z
nεnc2t
]
dF (n) = 0,
where we defined the elasticities εqt ≡ ∂q∗∂t 1−tq for q = en, ln and cn2 . Substituting the
elasticities from (76), (77), and (78) into (84), we arrive at (using (8) to eliminate e
n
zn
,
cn2 /R
(1−t)zn = ωγ
n, and (24)) the expression in the main text (27).
28
The first-order condition for the optimal capital income tax (29) is rewritten by employing
the definition of bn (see (23)) and the Slutsky equations
∂q
∂R
≡ ∂q
∗
∂R
+
(
cn2
R2
− en
)
∂x
∂g
, (85)
where q = en, ln, cn2 . Using
cn2
R
= ω ((1− β)(1− t)zn + g) (from (12)) and en = (1−t)βR zn (from
(8)) to rewrite the first term at the first right-hand side, we find
∂L
∂R
= −(ω(1− β)− β)(1− t)
R
∫ n
n
[(−bn + 1) zn] dF (n) + (86)∫ n
n
[
∆
R
en
zn
znεneR +
t
R
znεnlR +
τr
(1 + r)R
cn2/R
zn
znεnc2R
]
dF (n) = 0,
where εqR ≡ ∂q∗∂R Rq for q = en, ln and cn2 . Substituting the elasticities from (76), (77), and
(78) into (84) and dividing both sides by (1−t)
R
, we arrive at (30) (using (8) to eliminate e
n
zn
,
cn2 /R
(1−t)zn = ωγ
n with γn ≡ (1−β)(1−t)nlnφ(en)+g
(1−t)nlnφ(en) , and (24)).
Multiplying (27) by (ω(1− β)− β) and subtracting (30), we find
∆β
R
[(
1− ω²
µ
)
+ (ω(1− β)− β)
(
1 + ²
µ
)]
=
τr
1 + r
ω(1− ω)γ¯σ. (87)
Using
(
1−ω²
µ
)
+ (ω(1− β)− β)
(
1+²
µ
)
= 1 + ω, we arrive at (32).
Appendix D: Optimal taxation with verifiable learning
Roy’s lemma yields
∂υ(g, t, R, s, n)
∂g
= λn, (88)
∂υ(g, t, R, s, n)
∂t
= −λn (nlnφ(en)−R(1− s)pxxn) , (89)
∂υ(g, t, R, s, n)
∂R
= −λn
(
−peen + c
n
2
R2
)
, (90)
∂υ(g, t, R, s, n)
∂s
= λnR(1− t)pxxn, (91)
where pe ≡ ((1− t)(1− s)pxxn + pyyn) /en and λn is marginal utility of second-period income
(see Appendix B).
The government budget constraint (47) can be written in terms of t and R as∫ n
n
[
t (nlnφ(en)− (1− s)pxxnR) +R (pxxn + pyyn) + c
n
2
R
]
dF (n) (92)
=
∫ n
n
[
(1 + r) (pxx
n + pyy
n) +
cn2
1 + r
+Rspxx
n + g + Λ
]
dF (n).
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The Lagrangian for maximizing social welfare amounts to
max
{g,t,R,s}
L =
∫ n
n
Ψ(v(g, t, R, s, n)) dF (n) (93)
+η
∫ n
n
[
t (nlnφ(en)−R(1− s)pxxn) +R (pxxn + pyyn) + c
n
2
R
]
dF (n)
−η
∫ n
n
[
(1 + r) (pxx
n + pyy
n) +
cn2
1 + r
+Rspxx
n + g + Λ
]
dF (n).
The first-order condition for maximization of social welfare with respect to g is given by
∂L
∂g
=
∫ n
n
[
Ψ′λn − η + η∆xpx∂x
n
∂g
+ η∆py
∂yn
∂g
]
dF (n) + (94)∫ n
n
[
ηtnφ(en)
∂ln
∂g
+ η
τr
(1 + r)R
∂cn2
∂g
]
dF (n) = 0,
where ∆x ≡ − (Rs+ τr) and ∆ ≡ t1−tR−τr denote the tax wedges on xn and yn, respectively.
By defining the net marginal social value of income (including the effects on the tax base)
as
bn ≡ Ψ
′λn
η
+∆xpx
∂xn
∂g
+∆py
∂yn
∂g
+ tnφ(en)
∂ln
∂g
+
τr
(1 + r)R
∂cn2
∂g
, (95)
we find ∫ n
n
bndF (n) = 1. (96)
Using (89), (90), and (91), we write the first-order conditions for t, R, and s as
∂L
∂t
=
∫ n
n
[−Ψ′λ (nlnφ(en)−R(1− s)pxxn)] dF (n) + (97)∫ n
n
ηn (nlnφ(en)−R(1− s)pxxn) dF (n) +∫ n
n
η
[
∆xpx
∂xn
∂t
+∆py
∂yn
∂t
+ tnφ(en)
∂ln
∂t
+
τr
(1 + r)R
∂cn2
∂t
]
dF (n) = 0,
∂L
∂R
=
∫ n
n
[
Ψ′λn
(
cn2
R2
− peen
)
− η
(
cn2
R2
− peen
)]
dF (n) + (98)∫ n
n
η
[
∆xpx
∂xn
∂R
+∆py
∂yn
∂R
+ tnφ(en)
∂ln
∂R
+
τr
(1 + r)R
∂cn2
∂R
]
dF (n) = 0,
∂L
∂s
=
∫ n
n
[Ψ′λnR(1− t)pxxn − ηR(1− t)pxxn] dF (n) + (99)∫ n
n
η
[
∆xpx
∂xn
∂s
+∆py
∂yn
∂s
+ tnφ(en)
∂ln
∂s
+
τr
(1 + r)R
∂cn2
∂s
]
dF (n) = 0.
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Substituting the Slutsky equations, the definition of bn (95), and the proportionality
factors between gross income zn and the tax and subsidy bases (i.e., xn = αβ
(1−s)pxRz
n (from
(45)), yn = β(1−α)(1−t)
pyR
zn (from (46)), pee
n = β(1−t)
R
zn (from (62)),
cn2
R
= ω[(1−β)(1− t)zn+g]
(from (12)) into these first-order conditions, we establish
∂L
∂t
=
∫ n
n
[
(−b+ 1) (1− αβ)zndF (n) + ∆x
1− t
pxx
n
zn
znεxt +
∆
1− t
pyy
n
zn
znεyt
]
dF (n) +∫ n
n
[
t
1− tz
nεnlt +
τr
(1 + r)
cn2/R
(1− t)zn z
nεnc2t
]
dF (n) = 0, (100)
∂L
∂R
=
∫ n
n
[
(b− 1) (ω(1− β)− β)(1− t)
R
zn +
∆x
R
pxx
n
zn
znεxR +
∆
R
pyy
n
zn
znεyR
]
dF (n) +∫ n
n
[
t
R
znεnlR +
τr
(1 + r)
cn2/R
Rzn
znεnc2R
]
dF (n) = 0, (101)
∂L
∂s
=
∫ n
n
[
(b− 1) αβ(1− t)
(1− s) z
n +
∆x
(1− s)
pxx
n
zn
znεxs +
∆
(1− s)
pyy
n
zn
znεys
]
dF (n) +∫ n
n
[
t
(1− s)z
nεnls +
τr
(1 + r)
cn2/R
(1− s)zn z
nεnc2s
]
dF (n) = 0, (102)
where we defined the compensated elasticities εqt ≡ ∂q∗∂t (1−t)q ; εqR ≡ ∂q
∗
∂R
R
q
; εqs ≡ ∂q∗∂s (1−s)q for
q = xn, yn, ln and cn2 . We substitute
pxxn
zn
= αβ
(1−s)R ,
pyyn
zn
= β(1−α)(1−t)
R
,
cn2 /R
zn
= ωγn(1 − t)
(from the definition of γn ≡ pnc vn
(1−t)lnnφ(en)), the elasticities from (74) and (75), the first-order
condition for g (96), and the definition of the distributional characteristic (25) to arrive at
ξ −
(
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
)(
²
µ
)
+
∆x/R
(1− s)(1− t)
αβε¯xt
(1− αβ) +
∆
R
β(1− α)ε¯yt
(1− αβ) = 0, (103)
[
ξ −
(
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
)(
²
µ
)]
(ω(1− β)− β) (104)
− τr
(1 + r)
(ω(1− ω)σγ¯)− ∆x/R
(1− s)(1− t)αβε¯xR −
∆
R
β(1− α)ε¯yR = 0
ξ −
(
t
1− t +
τr
(1 + r)
ω
κ
)(
²
µ
)
− ∆x/R
(1− s)(1− t) ε¯xs −
∆
R
(1− α)ε¯ys
α
= 0. (105)
To find the optimal labor tax if we are also able to optimize the educational subsidies s,
we subtract (105) from (103):
∆x/R
(1− t)(1− s)
(
αβε¯xt
(1− αβ) + ε¯xs
)
= −∆
R
(
(1− α)βε¯yt
(1− αβ) +
(1− α)ε¯ys
α
)
. (106)
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Substitution of the corresponding elasticities from (81) and (82) yields
∆x/R
(1− t)(1− s) = −
∆
R
(
(1− α)(1− ρ)
1− (1− α)(1− ρ)
)
. (107)
Substituting ∆x ≡ − (Rs+ τr) and ∆ ≡ t1−tR − τr, we arrive at equation (48) in the main
text.
We establish equation (49) in the main text by substituting (107) into (103) and using
(81) and (82) to eliminate the elasticities ε¯xt and ε¯yt from the resulting expression. Similarly,
we derive (51) by substituting (107) into (104) and using (81) and (82) to eliminate the
elasticities ε¯xR and ε¯yR from the resulting expression.
We arrive at (52) by multiplying (49) with (ω(1− β)− β) and subtracting (49):
∆βθ
R
[(
1− ω²
µ
)
+ (ω(1− β)− β)
(
1 + ²
µ
)]
=
τr
1 + r
ω(1− ω)γ¯σ, (108)
where
(
1−ω²
µ
)
+ (ω(1− β)− β)
(
1+²
µ
)
= 1 + ω.
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Figure 1: Optimal capital income taxes
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Labor tax
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Key : Optimal capital income taxes as a function of optimal labor income taxes at baseline
values: r = 0.06 per year, cohort length is 25 years, σ = 0.5, β = 0.6, ρ = 1, α = 0.5,
ω = 0.33, and g/z = 0.25.
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Figure 2: Optimal capital income taxes and returns to financial investments
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Key : Optimal capital income taxes at given optimal labor income taxes when the real return
to financial investments r varies. Other parameters take baseline values: cohort length is 25
years, σ = 0.5, β = 0.5, ρ = 1, α = 0.5, ω = 0.33, and g/z = 0.25.
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Figure 3: Optimal capital income taxes and cohort length
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Key : Optimal capital income taxes at given optimal labor income taxes when the cohort
length varies. Other parameters take baseline values: r = 0.06, σ = 0.5, β = 0.5, ρ = 1,
α = 0.5, ω = 0.33, and g/z = 0.25.
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Figure 4: Optimal capital income taxes and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
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Key : Optimal capital income taxes at given optimal labor income taxes when the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution in consumption σ varies. Other parameters take baseline values:
r = 0.06, cohort length is 25 years, β = 0.5, ρ = 1, α = 0.5, ω = 0.33, and g/z = 0.25.
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Figure 5: Optimal capital income taxes and elasticity of human capital formation
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Key : Optimal capital income taxes at given optimal labor income taxes when the elasticity
of human capital formation β varies. Other parameters take baseline values: r = 0.06, cohort
length is 25 years, σ = 0.5, ρ = 1, α = 0.5, ω = 0.33, and g/z = 0.25.
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Figure 6: Optimal capital income taxes and the elasticity of substitution between inputs in
human capital formation
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.001 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Elasticity of substitution inputs in human capital accumulation
Optimal tau, t = .4
Optimal tau, t = .3
Optimal tau, t = .5
Key : Optimal capital income taxes at given optimal labor income taxes when the elasticity
of substitution in human capital formation ρ varies. Other parameters take baseline values:
r = 0.06, cohort length is 25 years, σ = 0.5, β = 0.5, α = 0.5, ω = 0.33, and g/z = 0.25.
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Figure 7: Optimal capital income taxes and the share of verifiable inputs in human capital
formation
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Key : Optimal capital income taxes at given optimal labor income taxes when the share of
verifiable inputs in human capital formation α varies. Other parameters take baseline values:
r = 0.06, cohort length is 25 years, σ = 0.5, β = 0.5, ρ = 1, ω = 0.33, and g/z = 0.25.
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Figure 8: Optimal capital income taxes and the share of retirement consumption
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Key : Optimal capital income taxes at given optimal labor income taxes when the share of
retirement consumption ω varies. Other parameters take baseline values: r = 0.06, cohort
length is 25 years, σ = 0.5, β = 0.5, ρ = 1, α = 0.5, and g/z = 0.25.
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Figure 9: Optimal capital income taxes and the share of transfers
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Key : Optimal capital income taxes at given optimal labor income taxes when the share
of transfers relative to gross incomes g/z varies. Other parameters take baseline values:
r = 0.06, cohort length is 25 years, σ = 0.5, β = 0.5, ρ = 1, α = 0.5, and ω = 0.33.
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